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The American Worker: Junior Partner in
Success and Senior Partner in Failure
By CIARLEs B. CRAVER*
BRADFORD TECHNOLOGIES ("BT") announced record earnings
last Friday, causing BT stock prices to rise 13%. The Board of Direc-
tors announced yesterday that BT President J.P. Watson's base salary
would be increased by 25% to $12,500,000, and he was granted a spe-
cial $5,000,000 bonus. The Board also announced a 2.5% cost-of-living
increase for all BT employees, but approved employee health plan
modifications raising the deductible and co-payment figures.
Charles Technologies ("CT") announced greater than expected
losses last Friday, causing CT stock prices to fall 9.6%. After CT Presi-
dent C.B. Wood indicated yesterday morning that CT would immedi-
ately lay off 3000 employees to reduce operating costs, CT stock prices
rose 11%. To reward President Wood for his courageous leadership,
the CT Board of Directors voted this morning to provide him with a
$3,000,000 bonus. At the same meeting, the Board approved Presi-
dent Wood's recommendation that employee wages be frozen and
that workers be required to assume a greater share of rising health
coverage costs.
I. Introduction
Over the past two decades, the United States has enjoyed the
greatest sustained economic growth in history.' Despite recent stock
reversals, the DowJones average has risen ten-fold from 1,000 in 1980
to approximately 10,000 today. 2 Individuals who purchased shares of
stock to finance business expansion have reaped the benefits of busi-
* Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor, George Washington University
Law School. Professor Craver wishes to acknowledge the support of the Institute for
International Corporate Governance and Accountability under the direction of Professor
Lawrence Mitchell. A modified version of this article will appear in a forthcoming book
sponsored by that Institute dealing with corporate governance issues.
1. SeeJOINT ECONOMIC COMMi-rEE, 106TH CONG., INFORMAlIION TECHNOLOGY AND
THE NE w ECONOMY I (Comm. Print 2001).
2. See Floyd Norris, With Bull Market Under Siege, Some Worny About Its Legacy, N. Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001, at 1.
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ness success. Corporate leaders have also been well rewarded for their
efforts. CEOs of large firms who earned about forty times the annual
salaries of regular workers twenty-five years ago now earn about 475
times average employee salaries." These managers have shared di-
rectly in the success of their companies.
Average workers have not shared in the success of business firms.
Over the past twenty years, real employee earnings have remained rel-
atively flat, with their modest wage increases merely keeping up with
cost-of-living increases. 4 These individuals have clearly been the junior
partners in firm success.
When corporations have experienced economic setbacks, em-
ployees have been the first to be cut. Company managers have reacted
to poor profit reports with quick layoff announcements designed to
reduce costs, bolster public confidence, and boost stock prices. Over
the past five to ten years, many leading companies have effectuated
layoffs of 1000, 3000, 5000, or even 10,000 workers. When these reduc-
tions were announced, share par value often rose along with CEO
compensation packages. In many cases, the firms ultimately rehired
some of the laid off personnel, or they retained contingent workers
from temporary agencies to fill needed positions. Often company
profits did not actually increase as a result of these managerial
changes, but share prices and CEO compensation did. The lower level
employees were clearly the senior partners in firm declines.
A. Impact of Declining Unionization
Why have corporate employees failed to share significantly in
firm successes, and why have they borne an excessive portion of firm
declines? These phenomena can be directly attributed to the decline
of representative labor organizations over the past two decades. When
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") in
1935, 5 which provided employees with the right to form labor organi-
zations and to designate labor unions as their exclusive bargaining
agents with respect to wages, hours, and working conditions, it
thought that this statute would provide workers with the opportunity
to influence management decisions affecting their basic employment
conditions. In section 1 of the new law, Congress explicitly recognized
"[t] he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
3. See Jennifer Reingold, Executive Pay, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 2000, at 110.
4. U.S. Factory Wages Rise But Just Kee) Up With Inflation, CHmc.Axo TRIBUNE, Aug. 11,
1996 at C22.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000) (original version at ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
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possess full freedom of association . . . and employers who are organ-
ized in the corporate [form]."6 Through resort to collective action,
workers were expected to share decision-making authority with their
corporate employers.
When the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the
NLRA, it similarly acknowledged the need for concerted employee ac-
tion to counter-balance the economic advantage enjoyed by corporate
firms.
[A] single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer....
[HI]e was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the mainte-
nance of himself and family .... [I]f the employer refused to pay
him the wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to
leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment.7
Congress clearly believed that collective action by workers would
enable them to participate meaningfully in firm management.
The enactment of the NLRA and the formation of the Congress
of Industrial Organizations ("CIO") spurred rapid union growth. As
CIO unions organized heavy industries such as steel, automobile, and
electrical manufacturing, membership in labor organizations ex-
panded. By 1940, there were 8,717,000 union members, comprising
26.9% of all nonagricultural workers.8 By 1954, union membership
exceeded 17,000,000, constituting 35% of nonagricultural
employees. 9
By the early 1960s, organized labor began to experience a relative
decline in membership, as the growth of the overall labor force out-
paced that of union ranks.lI Heavy industries in the organized North-
east and Midwest were no longer expanding, and many people and
jobs relocated from Snow Belt states to Sun Belt areas in the South
and Southwest."I The American economy was transformed from in-
dustrial and manufacturing jobs to primarily white-collar and service
occupations staffed by individuals unreceptive to union entreaties. In
6. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
7. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
8. See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN TIHE UNITED STATES
10 tbl. 1 (1987).
9. See id.
10. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF TI-HE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 34-55 (1993); see generally Seymour Martin Lipset & Ivan Katchanovski,
The Future of Private Sector Unions in the U.S., 22J. LAB. RES. 229 (2001).
11. Compare Edward E. Potter, Labor's Love Lost? Changes in the U.S. Environment and
Declining Private Sector Unionism, 22J. LAB. RES. 321, 325 (2001) (documenting the continu-
ing decline of unions), withJEREMy RIFKIN & RANDY BARBER, THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN:
PENSIONS, POLITICS AND POWER IN THE 1980s 59-68 (1978) (suggesting a future resurgence
of North Central and North Eastern states traditionally supportive of labor organizations).
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addition, overt employer opposition to labor unions increased as busi-
ness firms forced to compete in global markets concluded that the
increased labor costs associated with collective bargaining relation-
ships undermined their economic viability. Throughout the 1980s, la-
bor organization membership declined significantly. In 1990, private
sector unions had only 10,260,000 members-a mere 12.1% of nonag-
ricultural employees.12 By 2002, private sector union membership had
fallen to 8,756,000, comprising 8.5% of nonagricultural workers.' If
this trend continues, the private sector union density rate (percentage
of nonagricultural workers in labor organizations) may fall to 5% or
below within the next decade, rendering unions irrelevant outside of
limited industries. ' 4
The decline in union membership has directly diminished the
rights of organized workers and indirectly undermined the rights of
unorganized personnel. Employees with bargaining agents have en-
hanced their individual economic benefits. 15 Organized employees
not only enjoy higher wages than unrepresented workers, but also
more generous fringe benefit coverage. As union density has de-
clined, however, competitive pressures have caused unionized firms to
moderate wage increases and decrease fringe benefit protections.
Nonunion companies that traditionally maintained wage and benefit
packages commensurate with those of their unionized competitors to
avoid union organizing campaigns no longer feel the pressure to be
so generous.
Representative unions have not only provided members with en-
hanced economic benefits. Through the "collective voice" exerted by
organized groups, employees have advanced important noneconomic
interests. '6 For example, while most American workers are employed
on an "at will" basis, under which they may be terminated at any time
for good cause, bad cause, or no cause,' 7 union contracts generally
preclude discipline except for 'Just cause." Other bargaining agree-
ment provisions typically establish orderly layoff and recall proce-
12. See U.S CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEl'r OF COMMERCE, STATISTIcAL AnsTI,xc O1 -rHE
UNITEO STATEs: 2002 411 (2002).
13. See Pain Ginsbach, BLS Reports Small Drop in Union Members to 16.1 Million or 13.2
Percent of Workers, in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 38 at E-3 tbl. 3 (Feb. 26, 2003).
14. See Leo Troy, 7Twilight for Organized Labor, 22 J. LAB. RES. 245 (2001), Charles B.
Craver, Why Labor Unions Must [and Can] Sur1ive, I U. PA.. LAi. & EMI'. L. 15 (1997-1998).
15. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN &.JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 43-77 (1984).
16. See id. at 94100.
17. See MARK A. ROTHISTEIN & CHARLES B. CRAVER ET AL., 2 EMPLOYMENT LxW TREATISE
at 226-27 (2d ed. West 1999).
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dures, and require the application of relatively objective criteria to
promotional opportunities. If bargaining unit personnel are not satis-
fied with the way their employer applies bargaining agreement terms,
they may invoke formal grievance-arbitration procedures. If labor and
management representatives cannot negotiate mutually acceptable
resolutions, the union may ask neutral arbitrators to decide the con-
troverted issues. Without the rights established through the collective
bargaining process, such orderly and neutral grievance adjustment
systems would not exist as extensively as they do today.' 8
As the percentage of unionized employers declined, business
firms began to experience more frequent external legal constraints.
Throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, the collective bargain-
ing process determined most private sector employment conditions
for organized firms. Individual employers negotiated with local union
officials over the wages, hours, and working conditions applicable to
their particular employees. When unique circumstances warranted
special treatment, the bargaining parties accommodated each other's
competing interests. As union membership shrank, employers gained
the freedom to dictate their employment conditions. Although busi-
ness entities appreciated the absence of labor union influence, legisla-
tive and judicial developments filled the power void created by the
decline of organized labor.
Over the past three decades, increased external regulation of em-
ployment environments counterbalanced the decreasing power of pri-
vate sector unions, as unrepresented workers demanded enhanced
rights and protections. For example, various civil rights enactments
prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, na-
tional origin, age, or disability.' 9 Employers must maintain employ-
ment environments that meet federal and state health and safety
requirements. 20 Pension programs must satisfy federally-prescribed
vesting and investment rules,2' and firms must provide workers with
18. Some nonunion employers have unilaterally established internal grievance proce-
dures that may be invoked by employees dissatisfied by management decisions, but most of
these systems permit management officials to make the final determinations regarding
worker complaints. Although an increasing number of internal review procedures provide
for limited arbitral review, most are subject to employer control and are designed primarily
to restrict the right of employees to challenge adverse employment actions in judicial
forums.
19. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000); Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2002); Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2000).
20. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000).
21. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051 & 1081 (2000).
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advanced notice of mass layoffs and plant closures.2 2 Employers may
no longer give polygraph examinations to workers, and individuals
with parental or family emergencies must be given unpaid leaves. 25
Judicial intervention similarly restricted managerial freedom.
Shocking employee termination cases induced judges in most states to
create a public policy exception to the traditional employment-at-will
doctrine, precluding discharges for reasons that contravene important
public policies. 24 Courts increasingly hold employers liable for dis-
charges that contravene express or implied contractual limitations set
forth in personnel policies or employee performance review proce-
dures.2 5 Future judicial developments will likely further erode em-
ployer freedom in this critical area.
If employers continue to determine fundamental employment
conditions unilaterally with no real input from the affected employ-
ees, legislative and judicial intervention will become even more com-
mon. As federal and state legislatures discover areas of significant
abuse, usually at the hands of a few aberrant firms, new statutory pro-
visions will be enacted that will further restrict managerial freedom.
Judges appalled by egregious employer behavior will similarly act to
protect employee interests, even though the resulting doctrines will
constrain employers that do not treat their workers badly.
B. Need for More Individualized Employer-Employee Relations
Employer representatives frequently complain about the increas-
ing legislative and judicial regulation of employment relationships.
They claim the inappropriate behavior of a few fringe companies has
generated intrusive federal and state rules that unreasonably restrict
the managerial freedom of mainstream firms. They maintain that ra-
tional employers do not overtly discriminate or make personnel deci-
sions based on improper considerations, noting that such conduct
would be economically inefficient. 2" The cost of replacing skilled em-
ployees with firm-specific training is so high that corporate leaders
would not irrationally sever beneficial employment relationships and
risk placing their firms at a competitive disadvantage. 27
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2000).
23. See Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2000).
24. See ROIT STEIN & CRAVER, supra note 17, §§ 8.9-13.
25. See id. §§ 8.3-5.
26. See RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDs: TH-E CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINArIoN Lxws 33-34, 41-44 (1992).
27. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconcetualizing Cotporate Law to
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNE.LL L. REV. 899, 907-09 (1993).
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American business officials regularly maintain that human capital
is their most important resource. They claim to treat their workers
fairly and generously, because satisfied employees are loyal and pro-
ductive workers. To enhance employer-employee relationships, many
United States companies have created shop level employee involve-
ment programs designed to facilitate communication between manag-
ers and employees, to improve product or service quality, and to
increase worker productivity. 28 Many corporate leaders are concerned
that recent National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"') decisions have
jeopardized the legality of employee involvement programs by ruling
that such plans constitute "labor organizations" dominated by employ-
ers in contravention of the NLRA. To counteract the impact of these
negative NLRB decisions, business officials have sought enactment of
the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act ("TEAM Act"), which
would provide companies with greater latitude in this area.
Corporate executives believe that companies need worker partici-
pation programs to increase employee-management communication
and to enhance product or service quality and employee productivity.
They recognize that firms in countries like Germany, Japan, and Swe-
den have used employee involvement committees to improve competi-
tive positions in global markets, and would like to achieve similar
benefits. American business leaders often complain about the lack of
employee commitment to firm objectives. They ignore the fact that
the prevailing employment-at-will doctrine and the absence of real
worker involvement in the managerial decision-making process gener-
ate employee insecurity. 29 Employees reasonably fear that suggested
productivity enhancements will be rewarded-not by greater firm ap-
preciation-but by layoffs caused by the need for fewer workers."n Em-
ployees also believe that quality improvements will increase
shareholder equity and managerial bonuses, but have no impact on
basic worker compensation. If corporate leaders wish to improve em-
ployee morale, avoid the further proliferation of intrusive federal and
state intervention, and retain greater localized control over their
terms and conditions of employment, they should recognize the po-
28. See Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohibition: The
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 125, 137-38 (1994).
29. See LESTER THUROW, HEAD To HEAD 137-140 (1992).
30. See Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long
Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 513, 574-78 (1993). Employee suggestions save companies
thousands and even millions of dollars, yet the individuals who suggest the economizing
efforts are lucky to receive $100 bonuses. SeeJulie Flaherty, Suggestions Rise From the Floors of
U.S. Factories, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at C1.
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tential benefits to be derived from meaningful worker participation
programs.
C. Lack of Industrial Democracy for Most American Workers
Entering the twenty-first century, the United States effectively
stands alone among the developed nations, on the verge of having no
effective system of worker representation and consultation.31 Survey
data indicate that some thirty to forty million American workers with-
out union representation desire such representation, and some eighty
million workers, many of whom do not approve of unions, desire
some independent collective voice in their workplace. 32
The United States prides itself on being one of the world's great
democracies. Yet, in the private sector employment environment,
democratic principles are denied to the overwhelming majority of em-
ployeesA33 It is time for Congress and business leaders to acknowledge
two critical realities. First, the NLRA has become an irrelevant statute
for the vast majority of private sector employees, evidenced by the
continuing decline of private sector union density to below 10%. Indi-
vidual employees must either accept the terms offered by their em-
ployers or look for work elsewhere. For most employees, this "exit
voice" is meaningless, because economic necessity forces them to re-
main with employers that refuse to negotiate over basic employment
conditions. Second, corporate success is dependent upon the contri-
butions of three symbiotic groups: (1) the investors who provide the
necessary capital; (2) the managers who provide the requisite leader-
ship; and (3) the employees who perform the basic job functions.
Corporate laws carefully protect the rights of business investors.
Federal and state securities laws entitle prospective shareholders to
extensive information about a company before they decide whether to
purchase shares.34 Shareholders directly participate in the election of
corporate directors. 3 5 Firm managers owe shareholders a fiduciary
duty and are liable to stockholders who are injured by breaches of this
31. The 8.5% United States union density rate should be compared with countries
like Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, with union density rates of approxi-
mately 40%, 90%, and 50%, respectively. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 8, at 16 tbl. 3.
32. See Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck, Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works
Councils Stoy, in WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULES 97, 98 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994).
33. See Sanford M. Jacoby, Current Prospects for Employee Representation in the U.S.: Old
Wine in New Bottles?, 16J. LAB. RES. 387, 389 (1995).
34. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 295-96 (3d ed. 1983).
35. See id. at 188-89, 199.
[Vol. 37
STATE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
duty.3"; Because capital is a highly mobile commodity, shareholders
can protect their interests through diversification and by transferring
their financial support from poorly performing businesses to other
investments.
Corporate managers also possess the capacity to protect them-
selves against corporate vicissitudes. They enjoy access to confidential
information regarding firm performance, and exercise meaningful
discretion with respect to decisions that affect their own futures. They
frequently avoid the insecurity associated with employment-at-will ar-
rangements through individual employment contracts that guarantee
them continued employment for specified terms. They may obtain
generous severance packages to protect themselves from job losses
caused by corporate reorganizations or buyouts. Finally, they benefit
from business success through bonus payments and stock options that
are unavailable to most subordinate personnel.
In contrast, rank-and-file employees are generally treated no bet-
ter than the equipment they use or operate. Even though they commit
their working lives to the success of their respective firms, employers
can terminate them at any time for almost any reason. Employees are
not privy to confidential firm information, nor are they consulted
about business decisions that may directly affect their employment
destinies. Furthermore, their continuing economic needs, pension
rights, and length of service frequently induce them to remain with
their current employers during periods of declining firm
performance.
Employees feel increasingly isolated and unappreciated. 
3 7 Most
want the opportunity to be part of a larger employment community in
which they can openly share their ideas and concerns with their col-
leagues. 38 They want to know how their employer is performing, and
wish to be consulted about firm decisions that affect their employ-
ment futures. It is time for both business leaders and Congress to ac-
knowledge the significant contribution of employees to firm success
and to provide such workers with meaningful industrial democracy.
Congress should create a mechanism that enables employees to share
in the economic benefits they help to generate and provide them with
36. See id. at 231-42. -1
37. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOC-
RACy 65, 68-69 (1995). See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism
at Work, 1993 BYU L. Rv. 727 (1993).
38. See Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Worker Representation and Participation Sur-
vey: Report on the Findings 14-17 (1994).
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some voice with respect to their employment destinies. Political and
business leaders must recognize that "[t]he essence of industrial de-
mocracy is the right of employees to influence, decisions affecting
their working lives."3 9
This article will initially explore worker participation programs in
other industrial countries, and the voluntary plans used by a number
of United States -corporations. It will examine the different ways these
programs permit employees to influence firm decisions both at the
shop and corporate levels. It will then propose a worker participation
model for American employees that would optimally protect the inter-
ests of shareholders, managers, and employees.
H. Worker Participation Models
A. Foreign Practices
A number of European countries have established different
forms of employee involvement plans. Most include shop level groups
that focus on diverse issues ranging from narrow production topics to
expansive employment considerations. A few worker participation
programs include employee representatives on corporate boards.
These provide direct worker input when fundamental corporate deci-
sions affecting employment interests are being made. It would be ben-
eficial to briefly review some of the more salient forms of employee
involvement.
1. Germany
Germany has an established history of employee involvement pro-
grams. In 1891, it enacted the Arbeiterschutzgesetz, which provided com-
pany owners with the right to establish work rules unilaterally.401 If a
workers committee existed, however, the owners had to initially pre-
sent proposed rules to that committee. 41 In 1900, Article 91 of the
Bayrisches Berggesetz created statutorily mandated worker committees
for mines with over twenty employees. 42
39. R. Willis, Minister for Employment and Industrial Relations, Employee Participation
News No. 3 at 8 (1984), quoted in Lord Wedderburn, Trust, Corporation and the Worker, 23
OSGOODE HALLi L.J. 203, 249 (1985).
40. See Richard Richardi, Worker Participation in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 23, 25 (1982).
4 1. See id.
42. See id. See generally Walther MOller-jentsch, Germany: From Collective Voice to Co-man-
agement, in WORKS COUNCILs: CONSULTNION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 53 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds. 1995); Rudolf Buschmann,
Workers Participation and Collective Bargaining in Germany, 15 COMp. LAB. L.J. 26 (1993).
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The Betriebstategesetz, or Works Councils Act of 1920, directed the
election of employee representatives to supervisory boards, and pro-
vided for the use of worker committees throughout German indus-
try.4 3 In 1972, the Federal Republic of Germany enacted the
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Constitution Act), which directed the
election of works councils in firms with five or more employees. 44 Cor-
porations with 100 employees have five council members, firms with
500 employees have nine council members, and firms with 1000 em-
ployees have fifteen council members.45 Council representatives are
elected every four years by the wage earners and non-executive sala-
ried employees in proportion to their respective numbers. 46 Multi-
plant corporations have central works councils composed of delegates
from the establishment-level councils. 47 The vast majority of larger
companies have works councils. In firms that have not established
councils, three or more employees may petition the labor court to
create one.4x
Although 'German works councils do not determine basic com-
pensation levels, which are established separately through collective
bargaining procedures, they do have codetermination rights with re-
spect to employee bonuses and performance-rated pay.4 1 They also
have codetermination rights regarding overtime, leaves of absence, va-
cation plans, and the introduction of work monitoring devices.5 ' Man-
agement officials must obtain council concurrence with respect to
changes pertaining to these areas, or face the possibility of external
legal challenges. 51 Works councils possess limited veto rights concern-
ing such critical issues as employee transfers, downgrades, and dismis-
sals.5 2 Impasses in these areas are resolved through mediation or
arbitration by a tripartite conciliation committee or the labor court.53
43. See Note, Alternatives to the United States System of Labor Relations: A Comparative Anal-
ysis of the Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and Sweden, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 627, 631 (1988).
44. See Herbert Wiedemann, Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises, 28 AM. J.
COMP. L. 79, 81 (1980).
45. See Mfiller-Jentsch, supra note 42, at 57.
46. See id.
47. See Richardi, supra note 40, at 35.
48. See Mfiller-Jentsch, supra note 42, at 57.
49. See id. at 57-58.
50. See id. at 58-59.
51. See Richardi, supra note 40, at 35-38.
52. See id. at 37; Mfiller-Jentsch, supra note 42, at 59.
53. See Laurence Zakson, Worker Participation: Industrial Democracy and Managerial Pre-
rogative in the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the United States, 8 HASTINGS INT'L. &
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Works councils may not engage in work stoppages. 54 Works councils
have consultation rights with respect to personnel planning, changes
in work procedures, and the introduction of new technology. 55 They
are entitled to information pertaining to financial matters of interest
to employees, and they directly participate in the enforcement of
health and safety standards.56
Works councils, which function primarily at the local level, are
independent of representative labor organizations that are active at
the enterprise and industry levels.57 Nonetheless, the majority of
works councilors are union members, and unions frequently nomi-
nate lists of individuals for council positions. 58 Labor organizations
provide works councils with information and expertise, and council
members work closely with labor officials. 59
German business enterprises are governed by a management
board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) .60 Daily man-
agerial functions are-performed by the management board. 6' The su-
pervisory board is responsible for overseeing the management board,
and appointing and removing members of that body.6 2 Under the
Mitbestimmung (Codetermination Act) of 1976, one half of the supervi-
sory board members in corporations with over 2,000 workers must be
elected by the employees. 6 In smaller companies, employees elect
one-third of board members. 64 Except in the coal and steel industries,
in which employee-elected board members possess power equal to
that of shareholder-elected members, management officials retain ul-
timate authority in large corporations. 5 This is because some board
members are elected by lower level supervisory personnel, and the
chair of the supervisory board, who is empowered to break tie votes, is
elected by the stockholders. 66
COMP. L. REv. 93, 115-16 (1984); Manfred Weiss, Labor Law and Indstrial Relations in Eu-
-rope 1992: A Gennan Perspective, 11 COMp. LAB. L.J. 411, 418-21 (1990).
54. See Miller-Jentsch, supra note 42, at 60.
55. See id. at 58-59.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 61-62.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See Bennett Abramowitz, Broadening the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 34 Sw. L.J. 963, 982-86 (1980).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Miller-Jentsch, supra note 42, at 60 n.4.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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2. France
Unlike most Western European nations, which have relatively
high union membership rates, union density in France is similar to
that of the United States. 67 Despite this fact, however, French workers
have enjoyed a reasonable degree of industrial democracy since 1945.
Firms with more than ten employees are statutorily obliged to have
employee-elected personnel delegates. 68 Entities with fifty or more
employees must also have enterprise committees.39 Employees enjoy
dual representation in French companies through both personnel
delegates/enterprise committees and designated labor unions. 70 De-
spite the low union density rate, union leaders enjoy expansive power
through their ability to nominate personnel delegates and enterprise
committee members. 7 1
Personnel delegates and enterprise committee members perform
functions similar to those performed by German works councilors.
They are authorized to obtain relevant firm information and be con-
sulted regarding various issues of interest to employees. 72 Enterprise
committees focus principally on topics of corporate interest, while
personnel delegates concentrate on local issues pertaining to individ-
ual grievances and contract enforcement.7 " Although labor organiza-
tions may also represent workers with grievances, their primary
function is to negotiate collective contracts.7 4
French collective bargaining was historically conducted on an in-
dustry-wide basis, which enabled unions to minimize inter-firm com-
petition based on labor cost differentials. 75 Individual employers
sought to minimize direct union involvement in local affairs through
the use of personnel delegates and enterprise committees. 76 Prior to
the early 1980s, the role of enterprise committees was principally advi-
sory. They were consulted regarding planned firm decisions, but
67. See Robert Tchobanian, France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?, in WORKS COUN-
CILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 115, 140
(Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
68. See id. at 116; Marie Mercat Bruns, Worker Representation at the Enterprise Level in
France, 15 Comp. LAB. L.J. 15, 16 (1993).
69. See Tchobanian, supra note 67, at 116.
70. See id. at 115-16.
71. See id. at 116, 128.
72. See id. at 116-19.
73. See id. at 117-18.
74. See id. at 118.
75. See id. at 128-29.
76. See id. at 119-21.
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could only offer suggestions for management consideration. 77 The
1982 Auroux reforms restructured the collective rights of French
workers. 78 These changes were designed to decentralize the bargain-
ing process and strengthen the function of enterprise committees. As
a result, more collective contracts are now negotiated at the firm,
rather than the industry, level. 79
The Auroux reforms have strengthened the grievance processing
role performed by personnel delegates, and enhanced the authority
of enterprise committees." Before corporate managers make signifi-
cant decisions concerning economic, technological, organizational, or
social matters, they must consult with enterprise committee mem-
bers." ' These consultation rights cover such topics as mergers, worker
transfers, employee dismissals, economic reductions, employee train-
ing, and the introduction of new technology.82 While corporate lead-
ers may not make final decisions regarding these subjects without first
consulting enterprise committee members and providing them with
the information they require to evaluate proposed changes, enterprise
committees cannot prevent the post-consultation effectuation of firm
plans.8 Nonetheless, enterprise committees frequently negotiate
changes in company proposals that help protect worker interests.84
Enterprise committees also have the right to information concerning
the financial status of business entities. 85
Worker participation at upper management levels is limited to
the appointment by enterprise committee members of two delegates
to corporate boards.8"' While these employee directors can express
worker views during board of director deliberations, their function is
entirely advisory.8 7
77. See id. at 125-26.
78. See id. at 128-29.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 130-31.
81. See id. at 131.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 131-32.
84. See id. at 131-33.
85. See id. at 134.
86. See id. at 129.
87. See id.
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3. The Netherlands
Dutch law began to require works councils in 1950.88 The initial
employee committees were intended to increase communication be-
tween workers and employers.8 9 At that time, employers were still able
to select the council chairs.91 Following statutory changes in 1979,
firms no longer possessed the power to designate council chairs, and
Works councils were provided with expanded advisory and
codetermination rights.9 1 Full works council participation is man-
dated for firms with 100 or more employees, with more limited coun-
cil participation provided for companies with 35 to 99 employees.
9 2
Works councils are not authorized to negotiate collective contracts,
which are bargained by representative unions on an industry-wide
basis.9 3
Section 25 of the Works Council Act of 1979 requires covered
businesses to consult with works councils regarding proposed deci-
sions pertaining to such topics as enterprise control, mergers, take-
overs of other firms, significant reductions, plant closures, major
organizational changes, production relocations, major company in-
vestments, and the employment of outside experts.9 4 When councils
oppose employer changes in these areas, companies must postpone
final action for up to thirty days to give firm managers time to recon-
sider their contemplated changes. 95 Council advice is also mandated
with respect to the appointment or dismissal of members of supervi-
sory boards. 96
Under section 27, works councils have codetermination rights
with regard to working hours, job evaluations, health and safety mat-
ters, staff training, grievance processing, and the rules applicable to
the hiring, firing, and promotion of employees.9 7 When council mem-
bers fail to approve proposals subject to codetermination, the firm
may not implement the suggested actions until it first obtains the con-
88. See generallyJelle Visser, The Netherlands: From Paternalism to Representation, in WORKS
COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
(Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995).
89. See id. at 79.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 84.
93. See id. at 80.
94. See id. at 81.
95. See id. at 82.
96. See id. at 83.
97. See id. at 81.
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sent of a cantonal court, which must find that the council's disap-
proval was "unreasonable.' ' ' 8
Section 28 provides works councils with the authority to monitor
firm compliance with statutory and contractual obligations. 9 Council
members are also vigilant with respect to possible employment
discrimination. ")(
In highly centralized companies, there may be one works council
at the enterprise level, supplemented by employee committees at local
facilities."" In less centralized enterprises, each establishment may
have its own works council. Works council elections take place every
three years, and representative labor organizations usually nominate
candidates for council positions.1 2 Smaller firms have seven council
members, while firms with over 1000 employees have twenty-five
councilors. I03
Works councils have become established institutions in the
Netherlands. 1 4 Council-employer relations are highly professional,
with a minimal degree of adversarial polarization. Employers that ini-
tially feared that works councils would hinder firm progress have
found these committees to be valuable consulting groups. 1 5 Even
though works councils do not conflict with the bargaining functions
performed by representative trade unions, other factors have caused
private sector union density to fall from 37% in 1979 to 18% today."' 6
4. Sweden
Swedish workers are highly organized, with a union density of ap-
proximately 80%.07 Unlike other Western European countries that
have established worker participation programs that operate indepen-
dently from representative trade unions, Swedish cooperative groups
are inextricably intertwined with labor organizations.' 8 Worker par-
98. See id. at 82-83.
99. See id. at 81.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 86.
102. See id. at 87-88.
103. See id. at 88.
104. See id. at 92.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 102.
107. See G6ran Brulin, Sweden:Joint Councils under Strong Unionism, in WORKS COUNCILS:
CONSULTATION, REPRESENT,,TION, AND COOPEiRATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 189, 202
(Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995); see also Olof Bergqvist, Worker Participation in
Decisions Within Undertakings in Sweden, 5 COMP. Lul. L.J. 65, 75-76 (1982).
108. See generally Brulin, supra note 107.
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ticipation committees were mandated by the Act on Codetermination
at Work of 1976.1'19 This enactment provides local union committees
with the right to obtain relevant firm information and to be consulted
on a wide range of topics related to employment conditions.
Formal collective bargaining in Sweden is carried out on a cen-
tralized basis, with codetermination councils being used at local facili-
ties to monitor contractual compliance. I10 When issues of local import
arise, employers must meet with the appropriate codetermination
councils and seek mutual accommodations of their competing inter-
ests. IIIn the early 1980s, most codetermination procedures were for-
mal and were conducted through conventional negotiations. 12 In
recent years, codetermination discussions have been carried out on a
more informal basis, through regular exchanges between employer
and worker representatives.
Swedish employers that initially opposed codetermination obliga-
tions now use those procedures to enhance communication between
labor and management." 3 They regularly meet and explore various
issues of joint interest.' 14 The mutual trust and respect which have
been developed have enabled Swedish companies to reduce their
workforces, improve employee productivity, and reduce employee ab-
senteeism and turnover." I The success of the codetermination coun-
cils has also led to a de facto decentralization of the collective
bargaining process, with many local agreements being established.' 16
Under the Worker Directors Act, individuals who work for firms
with more than twenty-five employees can select two or three mem-
bers of corporate boards of directors.' 17 Most worker directors are ap-
pointed by the representative unions involved. II Employee directors
are in the minority and are unable to control board of director deci-
sions. 1 19 Nonetheless, they represent employee interests and keep
union officials informed regarding board proposals of interest to
workers.
109. See Bergqvist, supra note 107, at 76-77.
110. See Brulin, supra note 107, at 190.
111. See Bergqvist, supra note 107, at 76-77.
112. See Brulin, supra note 107, at 200.
113. See id. at 202.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 207.
116. See id. at 208-09.
117. See id. at 197.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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5. European Union Works Councils Directive
In 1994, the European Works Councils Directive was adopted
under the Maastricht Agreement on Social Policy. 120 This Directive is
currently limited to "Community-scale" undertakings with at least
1000 employees within EU Member States and with at least 150 em-
ployees in at least two Member States. 12' The goal of this Directive is
to induce covered enterprises to establish either European Works
Councils or similar procedures that provide covered workers with rele-
vant firm information and consultation rights. The Directive encour-
ages voluntary negotiations between employers and workers designed
to achieve agreements on topics of mutual interest.
In an effort to implement the general consultation rights set
forth in the 1994 Directive, the Transnational Information and Con-
sultation of Employees Regulations 1999 ("TICER") have been is-
sued.122  Company officials, worker representatives, and EU
administrators will have to determine the exact manner in which the
Directive and TICER policies are to be effectuated. It is clear, how-
ever, that covered business firms will be obliged to share pertinent
information with employee representatives and consult with Euro-
pean Works Councils or their equivalent with respect to matters of
joint interest. With the passage of time, it is likely that the 1994 Direc-
tive will be extended to smaller firms to provide more employees with
consultation rights.
B. Voluntary United States Practices
Despite the lack of codetermination legislation, a number of
American business firms have historically experimented with different
worker participation programs. During World War I, the federal gov-
ernment encouraged employers to adopt shop committees that would
provide employees with a greater sense of corporate involvement.12 3
Although most companies initially opposed such worker participation
schemes, some recognized that shop committees could be used to in-
crease productivity and employee satisfaction. 24 Employees could al-
120. See TONIA Novrrz & PAUL SKIDMORE, FAIRNESS AT WORK: A CRITIC:AL ANALY.SIS OF
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS Acr 1999 AND FIs TREATMENT OF "COLLE(FIVE RIGHTS" 161
(2001).
121. See id.
122. See id. at 163-65.
123. See DAVID MONTGOMERY, THlE FALL OF TIE HousiE OF LABOR: Tvi WORKPLACE, THE
STATE1, AND AMERI AN LABOR AcCTivisM, 1865-1925, at 416 (1987).
124. See id.
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ways raise issues of concern at shop committee meetings and seek an
acceptable resolution. Labor leaders quickly realized that such worker
participation programs were employed by many companies-not to
provide rank-and-file workers with meaningful influence over their
daily job functions-but as a means of manipulating worker feelings
and discouraging unionization.12 5 These concerns ultimately induced
Congress to include section 8(a) (2) in the NLRA to prohibit em-
ployer support for or domination of "labor organizations," which were
broadly defined to include employee committees that dealt with em-
ployers regarding grievances, rates of pay, and working conditions.
During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of American corporations
began to appreciate the potential benefits to be derived from coopera-
tive employee participation programs. Companies like General Foods,
Harmon Industries, Rushton Mining, and AT&T tried to "humanize"
their production facilities by creating employment environments that
provided workers with a considerable degree ofjob autonomy. 126 The
General Motors-U.A.W. Saturn Corporation "experiment," and the
General Motors-Toyota joint venture creating New United Motor and
Manufacturing, Inc. ("NUMMI"), provide more recent examples of
successful cooperative employer-employee participation programs. 27
Many other companies have decided to emulate their foreign
competitors and create shop level committees designed to minimize
employee dissatisfaction, enhance product or service quality, and im-
prove productivity. A recent study found that 64% of firms have estab-
lished at least minimal employee involvement programs,12 8 while
another survey found that 86% of the Fortune 1000 companies have
created involvement committees. 29 Some of these programs have
been carefully structured to avoid problems under section 8(a)(2).
They facilitate employer-employee communication and elicit worker
input regarding relevant issues, but attempt to avoid discussions that
125. See id. at 419-20. Not all company unions were anti-union artifices. See, e.g., San-
ford M. Jacoby, Reckoning With Company Unions: The Case of Thompson Products, 1934-1964,
43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 19 (1989).
126. See DANIEL ZWERDLING, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 19-51 (1980).
127. See Peter Linzer, Who Owns the Company? Rethinking Capitalism for the Twenty-First
Century, 3 REs. IN L. & POL'Y STUD. 217, 222-28 (1995).
128. See Paul Osterman, How Common Is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts It? 47
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 173, 177 (1994).
129. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Re-
port Issued !y the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations June 2, 1994, in Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 105, at S-23 (June 3, 1994).
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would bring their committees within the coverage of that NLRA
provision. ""')
Other firms have not been so cautious. They have established
joint employee-management committees that actually resolve worker
grievances and negotiate over existing employment conditions. 13'
When such programs are created in non-union environments and are
not used to thwart incipient union organizing efforts, they rarely
come to the attention of the NLRB. Thousands of shop level commit-
tees currently exist, many of which could technically be challenged
under Section 8(a)(2).132 Fortunately for the employers involved,
their employees are either sufficiently pleased with the functioning of
these worker participation programs or are sufficiently afraid of com-
pany reprisals to question the legality of these plans. Other workers
are simply unaware of the existence of the Section 8(a) (2)
prohibition.
The primary difficulty with employer-created participation pro-
grams concerns the one-sided nature of these arrangements. Manag-
ers decide the structure of these plans and the issues to be addressed,
and they generally reserve the right to determine which committee
proposals to accept.' 3 This provides managers with the chance to en-
gage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of employees. For ex-
ample, when worker participation committees improve productivity or
quality, managers may expropriate all or most of the increased firm
revenues. They have little incentive to share these gains equitably with
their collaborating workers. Rarely do the employees possess the
power to require gain-sharing as a prerequisite to the implementation
of improved operational procedures. As a result, employee members
of such committees are often hesitant to recommend changes that
may either cause the layoff of redundant workers or result in in-
creased firm profits that do not inure to the benefit of the responsible
employees.
Some might argue that reputational costs would deter opportu-
nistic managerial behavior, because companies with bad reputations
130. See id. at 34-42.
131. See, e.g., Electrornation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993); Webcor Packaging,
Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1995).
132. See id.
133. See Sanford M. Jacoby & Anil Verma, Enterprise Unions in the United States, 31 INDUS.
REL. 137, 138 (1992).
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would find it harder to attract and retain competent employees.,3 4
Others, however, have questioned the degree to which company
reputational concerns would preclude the excessive expropriation of
jointly generated, increased profit.'3 5 Only firms with highly public
reputations for egregious opportunistic behavior would suffer any real
negative consequences in this regard, with these negative effects being
minimal in times of high unemployment. 1-16 It is thus doubtful that
corporate managers would be induced by this factor to treat employ-
ees equitably when they are not required by other considerations to
do so.
It is informative to note that a recent nation-wide survey of 2408
workers conducted by Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers
found that 79% of individuals involved with worker participation pro-
grams believe they have personally benefited from those employer-em-
ployee arrangements. 3 7 Over three-quarters of respondents thought
that greater worker empowerment improved firm competitiveness and
enhanced the quality of the services or products being provided.' 3"
Furthermore, from 69 to 76% of surveyed persons without involve-
ment programs indicated that they would like to have such a collective
voice.'3 9 To the extent these programs increase employee job satisfac-
tion and firm loyalty, workers and their employers derive important
benefits from their existence.
III. Proposal for Mandatory Worker Participation
The time has come to provide rank-and-file employees and lower
level managers with basic employment dignity and true industrial de-
mocracy-to allow them to influence decisions affecting firm success
and failure. This objective can only be accomplished through federal
legislation mandating appropriate employee involvement. No state
could accomplish this goal within its boundaries without risking the
relocation of corporate citizens to other, less intrusive jurisdictions. A
134. See, e.g., George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The
Law and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSr 43Rn ANNUAL NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, 118 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990).
135. See, e.g., StewartJ. Schwab, Life-CycleJustice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employ-
ment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 26-28 (1993); Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker
Replacements: A Law, Economics and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 374-78
(1995); Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the
Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1953 n.5 (1996).
136. See id.
137. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 38, at 7.
138. See id. atl 8.
139. See id. at 9.
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mere modification of the NLRA to limit or eliminate the impact of
Section 8(a) (2) would not require firms to create employer-employee
committees. Furthermore, this narrow change would be used by many
companies to create programs selfishly intended to improve quality
and productivity with no corresponding benefit to the affected pro-
duction and service personnel.
If meaningful worker participation programs were "voluntary",
few would be created. American managers who have developed auto
cratic leadership styles would be hesitant to share power with
subordinate personnel. If worker participation programs could only
be established after a majority of employees voted to have such pro-
grams, business leaders would make it clear-as they presently do with
respect to unionization campaigns-that votes in favor of worker par-
ticipation plans would undermine firm viability and employee job se-
curity. In such coercive environments, most individuals would vote
against the establishment of real worker participation plans.
What would ever induce American business leaders to accept a
mandatory worker participation enactment? First, effective employee
involvement programs should enhance productivity, quality, and em-
ployee satisfaction.'11 Worker turnover should decline, making it eco-
nomically advantageous for corporations to accept the costs associated
with greater firm-specific training. If worker participation plans func-
tioned optimally, employees would be less likely to unionize, because
they would not perceive a need for external representation. Second,
mandatory worker participation systems should spur the proliferation
of legislative and judicial intervention in employment relationships.
Through employee involvement committees, companies could decide
issues in ways that best satisfy local interests, instead of having to com-
ply with national standards that govern all employment settings. In
some instances, local committees could be authorized to oversee com-
pliance with federal and state employment standards, and even be
permitted to grant waivers from those obligations when warranted by
appropriate local circumstances.
Cooperative employee involvement programs would be beneficial
for both workers and employers, because they would open direct
channels of communication between employees and managers. These
committees could insure that the "human aspects" of the work process
be considered during managerial deliberations, and they would pro-
140. See Jack Fiorito, Human Resource Management Practices and Worker Desires for Union
Representation, 22J. LAii. RES. 335, 340-41 (2001).
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vide employees with the enhanced sense of dignity and respect associ-
ated with industrial democracy and the satisfaction of being able to
influence decisions directly affecting their employment destinies.' 41
In addition, by decreasing the current information imbalance that
permits managers to act opportunistically at the expense of informa-
tion-deprived workers, a greater employer-employee equilibrium
would be created. 42
-Corporate leaders must realize that their lower-level employees
are not ignorant people. They usually understand basic operations
more thoroughly than upper managers. Workers are in an advanta-
geous position to enhance productivity and firm quality, but they are
hesitant to do so since such improvements may undermine their job
security. If they were treated as true corporate partners in a coopera-
tive venture and realized that new developments would not be permit-
ted to unduly affect their employment rights, they would be more
inclined to propose and support operational changes.
United States corporations that have instituted employee involve-
ment programs have generally experienced positive results. 143 Job sat-
isfaction has improved, and employee absenteeism and turnover have
been reduced. 144 Cooperative systems also make it easier for busi-
nesses to respond optimally to economic crises and international com-
petition, because worker input frequently provides managers with
ideas they might not otherwise have considered. In addition, em-
ployee participation in decision making increases worker support for
the final decisions.
Lower and middle-level managers might initially oppose em-
ployee involvement committees. The reorganization of work environ-
ments through the establishment of joint employer-employee
committees might evoke anxiety among supervisory personnel accus-
tomed to conventional superior-subordinate relationships between
themselves and rank-and-file workers. 45 Managers would have to de-
velop a new style that would motivate employees to accept their lead-
141. SeeJAMES FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARDROOM 91 (1977); A. H. Raskin, Toward a
More Participative Work Force, in WORKING IN THE TWENTY-FIRSi CENTURY 97 (Stewart Shepard
& Donald Carroll eds., 1980).
142. See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recogniz-
ing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1207-08 (1991).
143. See MICHAEL POOLE, WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRY 65-69 (1975); Stephen
Doyle, Improving Productivity and Quality of Working Life: The U.S. Experience, in HEM JAIN,
WORKER PARTICIPXrION 249, 255-56 (1980).
144. See HEM JAIN, WORKER PARTICIPATION 190 (1980).
145. See id. at 191; THUROW, supra note 29, at 173.
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ership out of respect for their professional expertise rather than fear
of their disciplinary authority. 14", They would have to appreciate the
fact that most individuals work harder to obtain respect and praise
than to avoid the negative consequences generated by poor
performance. 4
7
Many labor leaders would oppose mandatory worker participa-
tion legislation because they fear that employee involvement arrange-
ments would become a substitute for traditional union representation.
They must recognize, however, that worker participation would not
render labor organizations irrelevant. Neither shop-level committees
nor board of director representatives would be authorized to negoti-
ate over basic wage rates or possess the right to strike. In addition, if
worker participation programs were to function well, employees might
develop a greater appreciation for the benefits to be derived from col-
lective action. They might decide to seek the more expansive involve-
ment that could only be provided through conventional union
representation.
Successful worker participation programs should enhance em-
ployee job security and job satisfaction, and generate more hospitable
work environments. 14 In addition, with many fundamental employ-
ment issues subject to consultation with worker representatives, his-
toric employer opposition to union representation should decline.
Even unorganized firms would be obliged to consult with worker rep-
resentatives regarding matters of mutual interest, reducing the degree
to which managerial freedom would be diminished through tradi-
tional union representation. The cooperative nature of worker partici-
pation plans should also moderate the adversarial nature of
conventional collective bargaining, inuring to the benefit of both la-
bor and management. The fact that worker performance increases
more significantly with employee involvement programs in union en-
vironments than in unorganized settings' 411 should further discourage
146. See William hyte, Organizations for the Future, in THE NEXT TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
INDUSTRIAL Rti.ArIONS 132 (Gerald Somers ed., 1973).
147. See RonER'T A. ULLRICH & GEORC, F. WIlLAND, ORGANIZATION THEORY AND DESIGN
222-23 (Richard D. Irwin, Inc.1980) (discussing Frederick Herzberg's Theory of
Motivation).
148. See Robert E. Allen & Kathleen L. Van Norman, Employee Involvement Programs: The
Noninvolvement of Unions Revisited, 17 J. LAti. RES. 479, 479 (1996).
149. See Willian N. Cooke, Employee Participation Programs, Group-Based Incentives, and
Company Performance: A Union-Nonunion Comparison, 47 INDUS. & LIAt. REL. REV. 594, 606
(1994).
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employer opposition to unionization under a mandatory employee in-
volvement statute.
Union officials should support mandatory employee involvement
programs, understanding that labor organizations could continue to
perform important functions for members who worked in settings
with such participative arrangements. Unions could provide workers
with the information and expertise they would need to participate
meaningfully in cooperative worker-management schemes. Further-
more, unions could continue to use collective bargaining to enhance
employee interests with respect to matters not subject to resolution
through employer-employee committees. 1 5 1 Labor leaders must real-
ize that cooperative industrial relations plans could beneficially sup-
plant many of the inefficient practices associated with conventional
adversarial labor-management relationships.151
A. Shop Level Employee Involvement Committees
Congress should enact an employer-employee relations statute
similar to the German and Dutch works council systems.1 2 Every em-
ployer with at least 15 or 25 employees should be required to create a
minimum number of worker involvement committees. One commit-
tee would be required for each separate facility. In locations with
fewer than 100 workers, these committees could consist of three to
five persons, while establishments with 100 to 250 employees could
have committees with five to ten workers. Mid-sized facilities with over
250 employees could have committees comprised of about ten people,
with large installations with over 1000 employees having fifteen com-
mittee members. Where large facilities are involved, the law could re-
quire employee subcommittees for each distinct department or for
each group of inter-related departments containing employees who
share a community of employment interest. 5 3 These subgroups could
150. See generally Robert Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 U.S.F.
L. Rhv. 169 (1991).
151. An example of this innovative type of cooperative labor-management relationship
has recently been created by Nabisco and the Bakery, Confectionary, and Tobacco Work-
ers Union. See Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Nabisco and Bakery Workers Develop Vision for
Future, Steps to Achieve, in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 72, at A-6 (Apr. 15, 1996).
152. It would be inappropriate to contemplate a system analogous to that established
in Sweden, because their close relationship between worker participation and representa-
tive labor organizations is based upon a uniquely elevated union density rate that is un-
matched among American private sector employees.
153. Criteria similar to those presently used to define appropriate bargaining units
under the NLRA could be used to determine appropriate employee subcommittee group-
ings under my proposal.
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be comprised of three to five representatives. Multi-plant firms would
be required to establish enterprise-level employee involvement com-
mittees comprised of a specified number of individuals elected by the
members of plant-level involvement committees...
Every three or four years, company employees would nominate
and elect, in secret ballot elections, the members of their respective
worker involvement committees and subcommittees. 15 4 To ensure a
meaningful dialogue between employees and management and to
provide employment protections for managerial personnel whose em-
ployment interests are more aligned with their subordinates than with
their superiors, lower and middle managers would be allowed to elect
one-fifth or one-quarter of employee involvement committees. To sat-
isfy worker desires for truly joint employer-employee participation
groups,155 Congress may wish to authorize upper firm managers to
appoint one or two involvement committee members who may or may
not be permitted to vote on committee issues. This would enable
worker-elected committee members to communicate directly with
these managerial participants, and allow the managerial agents to con-
vey to workers the concerns of upper managers.
Even non-traditional workers should be permitted to participate
in employee involvement committee elections and functions. These
would include part-time, temporary, and "independent contractor"
personnel who are increasingly being used by American corporations
to avoid the legal obligations owed to permanent employees.'15 Con-
tingent workers with more than short-term connections to particular
firms should enjoy the same employee involvement committee rights
as regular employees. 157
Business firms should be legally obliged to provide enterprise and
plant-level employee involvement committees with information re-
garding basic operations and contemplated changes that would mean-
ingfully affect working conditions or employee job security, to
154. Even though 86% of individuals who responded to the Freeman-Rogers worker
participation survey indicated a preference forjoint employer-employee participation com-
mittees instead of independent employee-run groups, a majority would prefer to have em-
ployee-elected representatives instead of employer-appointed members. See Freeman &
Rogers, supra note 38, at 49.
155. See ROGERS & STREEK, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
156. SeeJacoby, supra note 33 at 392. Regarding the expanding use of contingent work-
ers by United States companies, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RE-
LATIONS, supra note 129, at 21-22.
157. Individuals employed by companies that provide temporary workers to other firms
should enjoy employee involvement rights vis-A-vis both their direct employers and the
firms for which they perform continuing job assignments.
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overcome the information imbalance that has historically existed in
private sector employment settings. 58 Proposed corporate changes
with respect to basic operations, major new investment plans, signifi-
cant market strategies, the introduction of new technology, job re-
structuring, health and safety concerns, significant job transfers to
other facilities, group layoffs, and individual terminations would have
to be presented to the appropriate employee involvement committee
or subcommittee for consideration. 159 Matters of general concern
would be assigned to the full committee, while issues affecting smaller
groups of workers could be sent to the relevant subcommittees. When
fundamental issues would affect the personnel covered by several
worker committees or subcommittees, management should be re-
quired to consult jointly with the relevant committees or subcommit-
tees in an effort to achieve mutually acceptable accommodations of
competing interests.
In most cases, employee involvement committee members and
firm managers would agree upon the proper course of action. Rank-
and-file employees understand the need for corporate efficiency and
increased productivity if employers are to remain competitive in an
increasingly global economy. They also recognize that superfluous or
incompetent personnel cannot be retained indefinitely without
threatening the employment security of all workers. Managers would
obtain a better comprehension of worker concerns, and would be
forced to appreciate the need to formulate corporate decisions that
would maximize worker morale and loyalty.
Congress should provide that when a majority-or perhaps a
weighted majority- of worker involvement committee members reject
proposed managerial action, a mediator with business experience who
has been previously and jointly.selected by managers and worker com-
mittee members would work with the parties to achieve a conciliated
agreement. Specific time limits could be imposed to require the expe-
ditious consideration of controverted topics. On those occasions in
which mutual accords are not generated within the prescribed time
limits, Congress would have to indicate how to resolve the resulting
impasses.
For matters that go directly to the core of entrepreneurial con-
trol, such as those dealing with basic operations or the direction of the
158. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 288-89 (1990); Michael H. Gott-
esman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imaging a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L.
Rv. 59, 76-77 (1993).
159. See Rogers & Streeck, supra note 32, at 100; WEILER, supra note 158, at 285-86.
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company, an employee involvement committee disagreement should
not be permitted to preclude corporate action. After firm managers
have consulted with committee members and sincerely participated in
the requisite mediation proceedings, they would be empowered to
unilaterally implement their actual proposals. This practice would be
similar to that currently operational under the NLRA with regard to
issues that constitute mandatory subjects for bargaining.'"" Once
good faith impasses are achieved, employers are authorized to imple-
ment what they have already offered to representative unions at the
bargaining table.'"' To prevent committee stalling tactics designed to
undermine the need for expedited company action, the passage of
the prescribed time limit would ipso facto establish the required "im-
passe" for the purpose of enabling the firm to make the desired
modifications.
If Congress was concerned that disingenuous employers would
use impasse-resolution procedures to determine unilaterally most con-
troversial policies, they could adopt an intermediate approach. They
could require that disputes pertaining to fundamental company poli-
cies be presented, on an expedited basis, before neutral individuals
who would determine the relevant factual circumstances and propose
non-binding options. These recommendations could then be used by
the parties to regenerate previously unproductive negotiations. After
the passage of several days, firm managers would then be authorized
to take the final action they deem appropriate.
Resort to mediation and fact-finding procedures should be man-
dated with respect to proposed management changes that do not go
to the core of entrepreneurial control, but significantly affect worker
job security and/or basic employment conditions. The minimal in-
fringement of managerial authority in these areas of joint worker-
management interest is necessary to provide employees with reasona-
ble participation in the firm decision-making process. These steps
would force corporate officials to consider worker interests and em-
ployee, mediator, and fact-finder suggestions they may not have previ-
ously contemplated.
When firm officials fail to consult with employee involvement
committees over proposed decisions that would affect employee inter-
ests, Congress should authorize district courts-or an administrative
agency like the NLRB-to enjoin corporate action with respect to
160. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See generally PATIRICK HARDIN, ET AL.,
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 696-99 (James R. LaVaute et al. eds., 3d ed., 1992).
161. See id.
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those decisions until meaningful consultation has occurred. When ap-
propriate, courts should also be empowered to require sincere corpo-
rate participation in mandated mediation and fact-finding
proceedings before final company decisions are effectuated. Congress
might also authorize the imposition of monetary sanctions on repeat
offenders.
The relatively brief delays that would be associated with the re-
quired employee involvement committee consultation would be more
than counterbalanced by the efficacy of better informed managerial
decision-making and a greater commitment to final determinations by
the affected employees. Studies have shown that works council consul-
tation improves the quality of the resulting decisions.' 62 Firm manag-
ers obtain more complete information and are induced to analyze the
relevant factors in an optimal manner.I6" This redounds to the benefit
of all concerned parties.
Disagreements over employee dismissals would be subject to dif-
ferent impasse resolution procedures. If management negotiations
with employee involvement committee members do not generate
agreement and mediation efforts are unsuccessful, the dispute should
be submitted to arbitration for final resolution. The arbitrators would
be jointly selected by managers and committee members. To protect
the right of firms to rid themselves of marginal or disruptive person-
nel, Congress could reject the traditional labor-management practice
of requiring employers to demonstrate 'just cause" for termination
decisions. 164 The burden of persuasion could instead be placed upon
the adversely affected employees to establish the absence of any rea-
sonable basis for their discharge. Since rational employers do not dis-
miss workers without justification, such a limited review procedure
would not unduly restrict managerial freedom. It would merely curtail
terminations that were not based on just cause or were imposed for
improper reasons.
Congress could reduce federal and state regulatory costs by au-
thorizing employee involvement committees to supervise the enforce-
ment of health and safety regulations, wage and hour laws, family and
medical leave provisions, and other similar employment legislation.
Regular committee monitoring would be far more effective than spo-
radic inspections conducted on rare occasions by understaffed federal
162. See Rogers & Streeck, supra note 32, at 109.
163. See id.
164. See FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 661-63 (4th
ed. 1985).
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and state agencies.. Furthermore, employee involvement committees
could be empowered to grant waivers from unnecessarily strict federal
and state employment regulations that would reflect local firm cir-
cumstances and not dilute .or undermine worker interests. Involve-
ment committees could be allowed to grant safety and health rule
variances and permit the substitution of compensatory time off for the
monetary overtime payments currently mandated by federal and state
wage and hour laws. These practices would be cost effective from a
regulatory perspective, and would more thoroughly protect the statu-
tory rights of the affected employees.
Employee discrimination claims arising under state and federal
civil rights enactments could be subject to employee involvement
committee review and resulting arbitral determination before they
could be considered by state or federal courts.165 Involvement of com-
mittee participation would enhance the likelihood of amicable resolu-
tions, and most required arbitral determinations would be accepted
by losing parties without the need for further proceedings. In those
relatively few instances in which these procedures fail to generate final
dispositions, resulting judicial involvement could be minimized
through the court acceptance of arbitral fact determinations gener-
ated by appropriate proceedings and supported by adequate
records.""" Legal conclusions should, however, be subject to de novo
judicial determination.
Corporate officials required to share confidential firm informa-
tion with employee involvement committee or subcommittee mem-
bers might reasonably fear the public disclosure of that information.
To minimize this risk, Congress should forbid the disclosure of confi-
dential information by committee or subcommittee members, and im-
pose severe criminal and/or civil penalties on violators. Such
restrictions would merely acknowledge the injury that could be caused
to both the company and its workers by the thoughtless or malicious
disclosure of trade secrets or confidential proprietary information.
Employee involvement committee participants (and worker-
elected board of director members) would enjoy access to firm finan-
cial information relevant to the determination of employee wage and
165. Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (requiring
employee to exhaust available arbitral procedures before seeking judicial redress for age
discrimination).
166. Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974) (indicating that
courts may give "great weight" to appropriate arbitrator fact findings in subsequent civil
rights cases).
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benefit increases. While they would have the right to express worker
views regarding these important matters, they should not be author-
ized to engage in conventional collective bargaining over general em-
ployee compensation levels or be permitted to conduct work
stoppages over employment disputes. 167 If they were given these ex-
pansive rights, traditional labor organizations would be rendered su-
perfluous. If employees desire these expansive prerogatives, they
should select a formal bargaining representative.
Despite the lack of collective bargaining rights, involvement com-
mittees should have the right to negotiate about incentive wage in-
creases or gain-sharing that might be granted to particular individuals
or groups of workers as a result of their increased productivity or
other cost-saving innovations. If such performance-based remunera-
tion issues could not be discussed, involvement committee members
would be reluctant to suggest operational improvements that would
only be of financial benefit to managers and shareholders at the ex-
pense of the responsible workers. The availability of gain-sharing dis-
cussions would encourage the disclosure of employee-developed cost
saving measures, and prevent the opportunistic managerial expropria-
tion of worker-generated savings.
Some management officials will undoubtedly consider a proposal
for the creation of employee involvement committees radical. Individ-
uals with an international perspective, however, will consider such
proposal unduly modest, considering the much broader codetermina-
tion rights enjoyed by works councils in countries like Germany. Given
the conservative nature of American business and congressional lead-
ers, it is unlikely that full codetermination rights would have any
chance of enactment. On the other hand, given the broad legislative
support for the TEAM Act and the fact that a proposal for mandated
employee involvement committees is not a significant departure from
what many United States corporations are already doing, political and
business leaders mightjust acknowledge the need for legislative action
on the level proposed to provide American workers with a minimal
degree of industrial democracy.
B. Board of Director Participation
Shop-level employee involvement committees could not provide
workers with full participation rights. While those committees would
167. This would be similar to the German practice. See supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text.
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significantly increase employee input with respect to daily decisions
affecting their employment destinies, they could not affect the funda-
mental decisions made at the top of corporate hierarchies. If workers
are to have the capacity to influence upper management delibera-
tions, they must be provided with board of director representation. '"
In a new employer-employee relations act, Congress should man-
date the election of one-quarter or one-third of corporate board mem-
bers by non-executive personnel. Both rank-and-file employees and
lower-level managers should be authorized to nominate and vote for
worker representatives. This would guarantee board consideration of
worker interests when important firm policies are debated. Where rel-
evant, these board members could offer alternative proposals that
would have a less devastating impact on employee interests.
Employee-elected board members should not merely serve the in-
terests of workers. These board members and those elected by share-
holders should have a dual fiduciary duty. They should be obliged to
consider both shareholder and worker interests when they make busi-
ness decisions,'" 9 and they should be subject to liability to either em-
ployees or shareholders when they violate their fiduciary obligation to
either group. 170
Some people might suggest that employee-elected board mem-
bers should only owe a fiduciary duty to the workers who elected
them, with shareholder-elected representatives having a duty solely to
the stockholders.' 7' This bifurcated approach would continue the out-
moded adversarial manager-worker relationships of the past and gen-
erate constant intraboard power struggles that would undermine
corporate viability.' 72 Requiring all board members to be responsible
to both shareholders and workers would encourage all board mem-
bers to work together in a cooperative effort to optimize the long-term
interests of both groups.
This proposal would clearly expand the duties that have histori-
cally been imposed on corporate leaders. In the early 1900s, the Mich-
igan Supreme Court succinctly described the monolithic duty owed by
168. See Gottesman, supra note 158, at 93-94.
169. See id. at 94-95.
170. See id. at 94-95.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 157-58.
172. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1263, 1264 (1992): "[W]ithotIt some form of check, such constant internal competition
would destroy the corporation.... A large portion of the entity's energy would be spent in
the internal battle for control. Even if one group . . . were to emerge dominant, all are
interdependent and cannot survive alone ... ".
[Vol. 37
STATE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
corporate board members to the shareholders: A business corporation
is organized and carried out primarily for the profit of the stockhold-
ers, and the powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.'173 Moreover, it is not within the lawful powers of a board of di-
rectors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose
of benefiting others. 174
This narrow view of board of director loyalty was reinforced by
the influential scholarship of Professors Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gard-
ner C. Means. 175 There was a concern, shared by these and other
scholars, that if multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties were im-
posed on corporate directors, they would be unable to maximize firm
profits and stockholder returns. 76 In more recent years, however,
courts, legislatures, and scholars have begun to question this single-
minded fiduciary duty model.
Some court decisions have acknowledged the right of board
members to consider non-shareholder interests when they make man-
agerial decisions. For example, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 177
the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that board members of a
buyout target could consider "the impact on 'constituencies' other
than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)."'178 Such decisions provide board
members with the discretion to consider non-shareholder interests
when they reasonably conclude that those other concerns should be
taken into account.
A number of state legislatures have adopted "constituency stat-
utes" that permit-but do not require-board members to weigh non-
stockholder concerns when deciding the future direction of their
firm. The Minnesota law is typical:
173. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 668 (Mich. 1919).
174. See id.
175. See Adolf A. Berle,Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trtstees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1369-70 (1932) (corporate managers are fiduciaries carrying on the business in
the sole interest of the stockholders with a duty to maximize shareholder returns). Compare
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932), with E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145 (1932) (suggesting that corporate managers owe a fiduciary duty to a more
expansive constituency).
176. See Dodd, Jr., supra note 175, at 1147.
177. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
178. Id. at 955, see also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1989).
Spring 2003]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director
may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider
the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers
and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community
and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the pos-
sibility that these interests may be best served by the continued in-
dependence of the corporation. 17 9
Over the past ten to fifteen years, downsizing has become an or-
ganizational mantra for many corporate leaders, resulting in the layoff
of millions of American workers.' Some of these firm reductions
have been required by economic exigencies and/or changing con-
sumer demands."" When true business factors dictate employer re-
structuring, it would be irresponsible to argue in favor of the
continued employment of superfluous workers. Such an approach
would jeopardize the continued viability of the company and the fu-
ture positions of the other employees. This reality does not mean,
however, that worker interests should be ignored when these deci-
sions are being made. Board members and CEOs should be legally
obligated to consider non-layoff cost-reduction options before they
decide to implement significant reductions. Even when layoffs are
necessary, firm officials should be required to soften the impact of
these reductions on the affected personnel. Retraining and relocation
possibilities should be explored to determine whether loyal employees
could be transferred to other useful positions. Severance packages
could cushion the adverse consequences for individuals who must ac-
tually lose their jobs.
Many corporate reductions appear to be motivated more by a de-
sire to temporarily-and often artificially-boost stock prices than by
long-term economic or operational considerations.1 2 As company of-
ficials announce expansive cost-cutting measures and concomitant
mass layoffs, share prices rise. Stockholders are gratified by the in-
creased paper value of their holdings, and corporate executives are
rewarded by bonus payments and/or the opportunity to exercise gen-
erous stock options."' When the announced employee reductions are
179. MINN. STrAT. § 302A.251(5) (1990); seeLawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Prac-
tical Framnework for Enforcing Cotporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579, 579 n.l
(1992).
180. From 1983 through 1988, 9.7 million employees lost their jobs due to layoffs and
plant closings. See O'Connor, supra note 142, at 1197.
181. See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Financial Crises Upon Collective Bargaining Rela-
tionships, 56 GEo. WAsH. L. REV. 465, 475-78 (1988).
182. See Allan Sloan, The Hit Men, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1996, at 44-48.
183. See id.
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excessive, former personnel are often reemployed as outside contrac-
tors or consultants, thus reducing the true economic benefit of the
proclaimed cut-backs.18 4 It is unlikely that these former workers will
ever demonstrate the commitment to firm success that they would
have shown had they been continued in their previous positions. As a
result, the long-term benefits of these pseudo-reductions are highly
speculative.
Other corporate machinations similarly threaten employee inter-
ests. Large business enterprises regularly restructure their holdings
through mergers, sales, or acquisitions that ignore the negative im-
pact of these changes on firm personnel.1 8 5 If board members and
CEOs were required to consider worker interests before they decided
to implement such restructuring programs, they might either forego
those changes not motivated by rational business needs or negotiate
contractual terms with corporate partners that protect employee inter-
ests. For example, selling firms could require purchasing companies
to retain the employees of the acquired entities for a minimal period
of time, or one or both concerns could agree to retrain and relocate
the displaced personnel.'l 6
The contemporary corporation is no longer a wholly private en-
tity that primarily affects a limited group of shareholders, customers,
employees, and the contiguous community. Large domestic and trans-
national enterprises have a "profound effect on the lives of a variety of
groups not traditionally within the corporate law structure."8 7 By ex-
panding the fiduciary duties of corporate leaders to at least include
those most directly affected by fundamental company changes, Con-
gress or state legislatures could greatly enhance the public interest.
When wholly selfish decisions are made that ignore appropriate con-
stituent interests, legal liability should be imposed.
Even though statutory provisions should recognize the dual loyal-
ties owed by all board members to shareholders and to workers, board
members must enjoy sufficient discretion to enable them to make
good faith managerial decisions when stockholder and employee in-
terests conflict without fear of personal liability. Statutory codification
of the established "business judgment" rule should provide board
members with adequate freedom to act on controversial proposals.8 8
184. See id. at 45.
185. See id. at 46.
186. See Mitchell, supra note 172, at 1315.
187. Mitchell, supra note 179, at 584.
188. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 242.
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Corporate officials who could demonstrate that challenged decisions
were designed to achieve legitimate business purposes and that the
interests of adversely affected constituencies were fairly considered
would be immune from liability.IH()- On the other hand, when they
wholly fail to consider worker interests and/or act to serve selfish per-
sonal or shareholder interests, board members should be subject to
the same legal accountability that would result if they currently failed
to respect the interests of stockholders. 1 90
Although Congress may wish to treat closely-held corporations
differently because of the limited number of shareholders associated
with such ventures, 91 these business entities should be treated the
same as publicly-held corporations. While the directors of closely-held
firms owe a heightened fiduciary duty to the narrow group of stock-
holders,'9 2 they should simultaneously be obliged to consider em-
ployee interests when they make managerial decisions that affect
employment conditions. When they fail to give adequate considera-
tion to the interests of employees, they should be subject to the same
liability as directors of publicly-held corporations who ignore worker
concerns.
C. Role of Unions in a Worker Participation System
Labor organizations would not be rendered obsolete through the
adoption of a national employer-employee relations act mandating
the creation of worker participation programs. They would continue
to provide employees with the assistance and training they would need
when dealing with employee involvement committees or corporate
boards. Unions should have the right to nominate employee slates for
employee involvement committee positions and board of director
membership. Employer agents should be prohibited from coercing or
restraining employees with respect to the nomination and election of
involvement committee or corporate board members. This would sig-
nificantly diminish firm conduct designed to undermine free and fair
worker elections.
If a majority or super-majority (for example, 60%) of employee-
elected involvement committee members were affiliated with a partic-
ular labor organization, that entity could be granted exclusive bar-
189. See Mitchell, supra note 172, at 1313; Mitchell, supra note 179, at 635-36;
O'Connor, supra note 142, at 1254-56.
190. See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 34, at 239-41.
191. See generally id. at 260-90.
192. See id. at 268.
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gaining rights similar to those currently enjoyed by majority
bargaining agents under the NLRA. 193 If no labor organization en-
joyed such support, each union with 20%, 25%, or 30% employee-
elected involvement committee member support could be entitled to
formal consultation rights.1 94 Since employees may vote for union-
nominated involvement committee members for reasons unrelated to
any desire for formal collective bargaining rights, the statute could
alternatively provide a separate ballot choice to allow workers to ex-
press their interest in bargaining representation.
When they vote to elect involvement committee members, this
separate ballot option could be used to determine whether a majority
of employees wish to be represented by a particular labor organiza-
tion, and, if not, whether any specified union had sufficient support to
be entitled to consultation rights. To be included in such a represen-
tational vote, a labor organization would have to obtain the traditional
30% "showing-of-interest" 1 5 from a group of employees sharing a suf-
ficient community of interest to constitute an appropriate bargaining
unit,'19 with these issues continuing to be determined by the National
Labor Relations Board.
Firm managers would be required to consult with representatives
from each organization that achieved consultation rights before they
made final decisions with respect to matters affecting employee inter-
ests. Even though formal bargaining would not be required, these mi-
nority entities would provide managers with critical input. They would
articulate employee concerns and propose options that would be less
injurious to worker interests. Labor organizations with consultation
rights that are not consulted regarding matters of employee interest
should be able to petition a district court for injunctive orders pre-
cluding the implementation of contemplated firm action before cor-
porate officials satisfy their obligation to discuss these matters with
appropriate union representatives.
Labor organizations with consultation rights would not be em-
powered to engage in traditional collective bargaining nor be permit-
ted to conduct work stoppages. Employees violating this principle
would be subject to summary discharge, and responsible labor organi-
193. See HARDIN, supra note 160, at 587-746.
194. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, The Road Not Taken: Some Thoughts on Nonmajority
Employee Representation, 69 CuI.-KENT L. REV. 1995 (1993).
195. See 29 C.F.R. 101.18(a) (1996) (sets forth the NLRB's Statements of Procedure).
196. This requirement is imposed by Section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 159(a)
(1992). See generally HARDIN, supra note 160, at 448-508 (explicating the standards applied
by the Labor Board to determine the appropriateness of proposed bargaining units).
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zations would forfeit their existing consultative status. Since consulta
tive labor organizations would not possess the power to block
proposed management action, union leaders would have to recognize
the need to establish sufficiently cooperative relationships with man-
agement officials to guarantee meaningful consideration of union
suggestions. Adversarial behavior would be antithetical to real em-
ployer-employee cooperation, thus I would expect labor officials to
seek mutually respectful relationships that would optimally further
worker and corporate interests. Union leaders who try to convert con-
sultation into full collective bargaining or to continue antiquated ad-
versarial practices would find themselves unable to meaningfully
influence corporate actions.
Conclusion
The NLRA was intended to provide American workers with a
meaningful degree of industrial democracy through the collective bar-
gaining process. Following its enactment, union membership ex-
panded rapidly and bargaining agreements effectively advanced
employee interests. During the past several decades, however, union
membership has declined to 9% of private sector personnel.' The
other 91% of workers have no ability to influence corporate decisions
that significantly affect their employment destinies.
In most European countries, legislative enactments promote in-
dustrial democracy through both local-level works councils and em-
ployee-elected members of corporate boards. It is time to
acknowledge that collective bargaining is unlikely to further the inter-
ests of most American employees. If they are to enjoy a modicum of
industrial democracy, Congress must explore alternative avenues of
worker input. Most United States firms have voluntarily established
shop-level participation committees that are primarily designed to en-
hance productivity and quality. Even though these programs have
been used narrowly, most have generated beneficial results.
American companies have sought NLRA amendments that would
expand their right to create voluntary quality of work life committees.
If these institutions are to fairly protect worker interests, they should
be regulated by federal statute. Covered firms should be obliged to
establish local employee involvement committees that have the right
to see relevant company financial information and be consulted re-
garding proposed changes that would significantly affect employee in-
terests. Mediation. and fact-finding procedures could be used to
encourage the mutual resolution of conflicts between involvement
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committee members and management officials. Wrongful termina-
tions should be proscribed and subject to employee involvement com-
mittee consideration, and, when necessary, external arbitral review.
Rank-and-file employees and lower level managers should be
given the right to elect one-third or one-fourth of corporate board
members. Both worker-elected and shareholder-elected board mem-
bers should be obliged to consider fairly the rights of both employees
and stockholders when they determine basic firm policies. Directors
who fail to satisfy this dual fiduciary duty should be subject to civil
liability. On the other hand, board members who exercise their mana-
gerial judgment in a rational manner to achieve legitimate business
objectives and who carefully consider competing employee and share-
holder interests before they act should be immune from liability.
Labor organizations that are unable to achieve majority support
but do generate 20%, 25%, or 30% employee support should be
granted consultation rights. While consultative unions would not have
the right to strike or be empowered to demand conventional collec-
tive bargaining, they would be granted access to relevant firm informa-
tion and have the right to be consulted before employers implement
policies that would directly affect worker interests.
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